

# **TANF is Broken!**

## **The Real Irony is Believing It's been a Success**

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In several recent blog posts, Matt Weidinger of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) discusses the status of various bills to reauthorize or extend the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.<sup>2</sup> He notes that Congress has a history of authorizing short-term extensions rather than undertaking “meaningful TANF reform.” Weidinger believes that these TANF extension bills are “thick with irony,” including:

...the lesson of the TANF program – that reforms can be made to help millions of low-income parents move from welfare to work and escape poverty, and all without requiring additional spending – is so totally lost on the rest of official Washington.

As explained below, Weidinger has not learned the lesson(s) of TANF; the real irony is in believing it's been a success.

This response addresses some of the points made by Weidinger in several of his blog posts. It is not intended to be a comprehensive critique of TANF or a full analysis of any TANF reauthorization proposal. Each statement is followed by a “PC Response” – short for “Peter the Citizen.” (This response is relatively brief, but includes endnotes and references to other papers with more detail.)

**Matt Weidinger:** “This latest extension will be for six months, nominally providing the new House and Senate time to work out a deal on more comprehensive reform legislation. Whether that occurs of course remains to be seen – and pessimists could note that the last full TANF reform bill was enacted in 2006, or well before most children currently assisted by TANF were born.”


**PC Response:** A realist would note that TANF is a “broken” program and has been broken from its inception. While the law sent a symbolic message about the importance of work requirements and time limits, in practice, neither of these elements have been implemented in the way Congress intended. In fact, TANF is not “welfare reform” at all, but a fixed and flexible funding stream that has failed to provide an adequate safety net or an effective welfare-to-work program. In many states, it has become a slush fund used to supplant state spending and fill budget holes. In 22 years, Congress has failed to meaningfully address any of its problems.<sup>3</sup>

The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 can hardly be considered a meaningful “TANF reform bill.” It was intended to strengthen work requirements by reforming misguided provisions (the caseload reduction credit) and eliminating loopholes (by including families served in separate state programs in the work rate calculation, defining work activities, and focusing work

requirements on “work-eligible individuals”), but it just led to new loopholes – solely state funded programs, token payments, and “excess MOE” for the revised caseload reduction credit.<sup>4</sup>

**Matt Weidinger:** “... straight extensions like this are regular exercises, which often occur as part of end-of-year legislation designed to keep TANF and other programs operating. ...these TANF extension bills are thick with irony.

The first irony is that it appears the one thing Republicans and Democrats in Washington can regularly agree on is making small annual reductions in the real value of one of the nation’s key cash welfare programs. As shown in the chart below, the accumulated effect of these extensions is that inflation has eroded the real value of the TANF block grant by over 37 percent since its creation.”



**PC Response:** Conservatives have been blinded by the misconception that TANF has been a “success” and they have obstructed meaningful reform and left Democrats no choice but to agree to straight extensions. This is hardly ironic. What was the alternative? Weidinger’s assessment is also misleading and fails to convey a complete picture of the adequacy of the TANF block grant and how its value has changed over time.

First, the “1996 funding level” should not be the block grant amount, but what states actually spent in federal dollars on TANF and the related programs used in determining the block grant. That amount was just under \$15 billion (vs. the \$16.4 billion block grant).<sup>5</sup> As a result, Congress overpaid states when they established TANF by giving them a significant windfall. And, since caseloads would have continued to decline whether TANF was enacted or not, the windfall in the early years was actually far more than suggested by the \$1.4 billion differential. Given that conservatives typically base claims of TANF’s success on positive trends in various outcomes between 1996 and 2000, it is noteworthy that the most significant change during this

period was a substantial infusion of federal funding. (TANF actually weakened work requirements, as 31 states had a 0 percent target for their overall rate in 2000 due to the caseload reduction credit, meaning they had to place no one in work activities.)

Second, while inflation has been an important factor in eroding the value of the block grant and eventually transformed the windfall into a deficit, other factors are important as well, most notably demographic changes (e.g., changes in the number of poor families with children) and the tendency for many states to divert TANF dollars to supplant existing state spending or otherwise fill budget holes. Before joining AEI, Weidinger served as the deputy staff director of the House Committee on Ways and Means and Rep. Kevin Brady of Texas was its chairman. It is instructive to see how these factors played out in his state.

- *Demographics:* Between 1995/96 and 2016/17, the number of families with children living in deep poverty rose from 218,637 to 254,670, suggesting a need for more funding. Meanwhile, the state's TANF caseload fell from 257,761 to 24,545.<sup>6</sup> As a result, the ratio of families receiving assistance to those in deep poverty fell from 118 to less than 10.
- *TANF as a form of revenue sharing:* In fiscal year (FY) 2017, Texas spent just 15 percent of its TANF and related maintenance-of-effort (MOE) funds on basic assistance, work activities, and child care – core welfare reform purposes. Instead, nearly 70 percent went to preK and child welfare.<sup>7</sup> (Note: this was not necessarily new spending for these activities, but in part represents supplantation using federal dollars and counting pre-existing state spending as MOE.<sup>8</sup>)

**Matt Weidinger:** “The second irony is that Democrats, who regularly decry ‘the value of TANF funding [falling] by more than one-third since 1996,’ generally have supported the bills cutting the real value of TANF over time. Indeed, only three times in over three dozen votes did a majority of Democrats not support extending the TANF block grant without an inflation adjustment. Across all those votes, the most common Democrat vote share was 100 percent (14 times) followed by over 90 percent (12 times).”

**PC Response:** Again, the fact that Democrats have supported extensions that cut the real value of TANF due to inflation is not ironic; the alternative might be to have no funding at all, given the intransigence of conservatives in Congress to consider “meaningful reform.”

With respect to those “who regularly decry the value of TANF funding falling,” Weidinger provides a link to an article by Rep. Lloyd Doggett, “It’s Time to Fix the Broken Welfare System.”<sup>9</sup> In this article, Rep. Doggett identifies three needed reforms:

- “First, we must hold states accountable for properly spending the funding they get from Washington.” He properly notes that states have diverted TANF funds from core welfare reform purposes (i.e., basic assistance, work activities, and work supports) to instead “plug budget holes,” adding that it has become “welfare for states.”

- “Second, we need to eliminate provisions that restrict access to the education and training that low-income parents need to succeed.” TANF’s work requirements are based on the misguided belief that a narrow “work first” approach is the best model because a preliminary (mis)reading of the findings from random assignment experiments conducted under the prior AFDC program suggested they produced better impacts on employment and earnings. Subsequent research findings suggest that there were more effective approaches and that allowing more education and training could enhance program impacts. (Moreover, none of the welfare-to-work programs evaluated in these experiments would come close to meeting TANF’s work participation standards. In particular, there was no evidence that a 50 percent requirement was feasible or desirable, that the 20- or 30-hour per week requirements were appropriate, or that the various restrictions on countable work activities would result in more effective programming.)
- “Third, we need to hold states accountable for providing a safety net for families who either can’t work or can’t find work.” He notes that the ratio of families receiving TANF to the number of poor families with children has declined from 68 in 1996 to just 23 in 2014.

All of Rep. Doggett’s criticisms are valid and actually understate TANF’s problems. Indeed, contrast his analysis with the statements of the three most recent Republican chairmen of the Ways and Means Committee (Rep. Dave Camp, Rep. Paul Ryan, and Rep. Kevin Brady) who repeatedly (and erroneously) asserted that TANF was a success, even as it failed miserably in their own states.

- Former Rep. Dave Camp of Michigan: “The 1996 welfare reforms led to more work and earnings and less welfare dependence and poverty among low-income Americans. However, President Obama recently took steps to undermine the work requirements that were an essential part of those reforms.”<sup>10</sup> Any “undermining” of work requirements from the waivers proposed by the Obama Administration would have paled in comparison to the gaming of TANF’s work requirements states regularly undertake under the existing authority of the law. This is no more evident than in Michigan. And, the state has proven to be equally creative in manipulating TANF’s funding streams to divert spending from core welfare reform activities to fill budget holes. See: “TANF in Michigan: Did We Really “Fix” Welfare in 1996? A Cautionary Tale,” May 25, 2016, available at: <https://petergermanis.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/TANF-is-Broken-in-Michigan.052716.pdf>.
- Former Speaker Paul Ryan of Wisconsin: “[The 1996 welfare reform law] is the crown jewel and the centerpiece of some of the most successful social policy legislation we’ve passed. It lowered child poverty rates, it moved people from welfare to work – because of these work requirements.”<sup>11</sup> Notably, in recent years, Wisconsin was one of just a few states that attempted to meet TANF’s work requirements without the use of gimmicks. The result? It failed to meet its minimum targets for five consecutive years (FY 2012-FY 2016) and thus ran the risk of large financial penalties. See: “The Failure of TANF Work Requirements in Wisconsin: A Note for Speaker Ryan,” August 22, 2016, available

at: <https://petergermanis.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/The-Failure-of-TANF-Work-Requirements.Wisconsin.pdf>; see also, “The Need for Common Sense Conservative Welfare Reform: Ten Questions for House Speaker Paul Ryan,” January 6, 2016, pp. 9-10, available at: <https://petergermanis.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Germanis2016Need.pdf>.

- Rep. Kevin Brady of Texas: “Twenty years ago, Republicans successfully concluded a multi-year, national effort to reform America’s cash welfare program. The reform was based on one simple idea: the best way to change lives and help people out of poverty is a job.”<sup>12</sup> Work requirements are irrelevant in Texas, because virtually no one receives assistance. Instead, the state uses the funds fill budget holes in programs unrelated to core welfare reform purposes. See: “TANF in Texas: The Need for “A Much Better Way”: A Cautionary Tale for Ways and Means Chairman Brady,” September 1, 2016, available at: <https://petergermanis.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/TANF-is-Broken-in-Texas.pdf>.

**Matt Weidinger:** “The third irony is that the lesson of the TANF program – that reforms can be made to help millions of low-income parents move from welfare to work and escape poverty, and all without requiring additional spending – is so totally lost on the rest of official Washington.”

**PC Response:** The real lesson from TANF is that giving states a blank check with no accountability combined with work requirements that are unreasonable (for recipients), unrealistic (for states, but for all the loopholes), and not based on evidence will lead to bureaucratic disentanglement and a “program” that is really welfare for state politicians, not needy families.


Weidinger provides no evidence for his claim that TANF helped “millions of low-income parents move from welfare to work and escape poverty.” It is presumably based on the fact that in the immediate years after TANF was created, the poverty rate for single mother families with children declined and their employment rate increased. A simplistic before-and-after comparison of data points is not a strong basis for making statements of cause-and-effect; for a more detailed explanation, see “A Note to Pre-Post Conservatives: You Are Not Fooling Anyone – Except Maybe Yourselves (and Some Politicians),” September 2, 2017, <https://petergermanis.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/PrePost-Conservatives.0904.pdf>.

Even if one accepts this approach to establishing causality, however, it is useful to put these trends in perspective. A figure from a recently released report by the President’s Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) does this:

Figure 12 shows for single mothers with children, (i) AFDC/TANF receipt, (ii) employment, and (iii) poverty, each expressed as a rate in the population and then indexed to 1987 values. Between 1996 and 2000, single mother caseloads fell by 53 percent. Over the same period, their employment rate increased by 10 percent, and their poverty rate fell by 20 percent.<sup>13</sup>

The CEA highlights the fact that, for female-headed families, between 1996 and 2000, “caseloads fell by 53 percent” while “their employment rate increased by 10 percent and their poverty rate fell by 20 percent.” These trends, however, only emphasize the fact that the number receiving assistance fell much faster than the number gaining employment or lifted out of poverty. Indeed, by 2013, the endpoint of the CEA analysis, the employment and poverty rates are about the same as in 1996, but the percent receiving welfare declined by about 75 percent. If anything, the CEA figure should be a cautionary tale about TANF (and its work requirements).

**Figure 12. Index of Percent of Female-Headed Families Employed, in Poverty and Receiving AFDC/TANF, 1987–2013**



Even as welfare caseloads fell sharply, the number of families with incomes low enough to qualify for TANF did not. Table 1 shows the change in the *average monthly* number of families eligible for assistance compared to the *average monthly* number receiving assistance for selected years from 1996 to 2015. In 1996 (before TANF), about 5.6 million families were eligible to receive benefits and about 4.4 million (79 percent of those eligible) did so. By 2015, the number eligible for TANF was higher (6.1 million), but the number receiving benefits fell over 60 percent to 1.6 million (26 percent of those eligible).

| Table 1:<br>Number and Percentage of Eligible Families Participating in TANF<br>(Average Monthly Data, Selected Years, 1996-2015) |                        |                             |  |                        |
|---|------------------------|-----------------------------|--|------------------------|
| Year  | TANF                   |                             |  |                        |
|   | Eligible<br>(millions) | Participating<br>(millions) | Eligible, Not<br>Participating<br>(millions) | Participation Rate (%) |
| 1996  | 5.6                    | 4.4                         | 1.2  | 78.9                   |
| 2000  | 4.4                    | 2.3                         | 2.1  | 51.8                   |
| 2004  | 5.1                    | 2.2                         | 2.9  | 42.0                   |
| 2008  | 5.2                    | 1.7                         | 3.5  | 33.0                   |
| 2012  | 5.7                    | 1.9                         | 3.8  | 32.4                   |
| 2015  | 6.1                    | 1.6                         | 4.5  | 26.3                   |

Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, *Welfare Indicators and Risk Factors: Seventeenth Report to Congress*, May 4, 2018, p. A-11, available at: <https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/259196/WELFAREINDICATORS17THREPORT.pdf>.

If TANF (and its work requirements) were a success in getting needy families to work, one would expect the number eligible for assistance and the caseload to decline in tandem. Instead, the number of families that were eligible for TANF cash assistance but that did not receive it grew by 3.3 million, from 1.2 million to 4.5 million.

It is true that there have been major expansions in other means-tested programs, but these mainly benefited those who worked and who were not poor. As Rep. Doggett observed, TANF has failed “for families who either can’t work or can’t find work.” Sadly, Congress continues to develop proposals that treat the symptoms, but fail to fix the problems.

**Matt Weidinger:** “With the notable exception of the TANF program, in Washington spending on means-tested benefits – but not accountability for results – typically only grows year after year.”

**PC Response:** Weidinger is right about spending trends on means-tested programs – the growth has been substantial and this spending has contributed significantly to the decline in poverty when using measures that incorporate the value of in-kind transfers and tax credits. In contrast, TANF has undoubtedly pushed millions of families deeper into poverty.

Conservatives often complain about the lack of accountability in programs, as reflected in the House Budget Committee’s FY 2017 budget recommendation to terminate the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG), which it characterizes it as a payment to states “without any matching, accountability, or evaluation requirements...”<sup>14</sup> These concerns pale in comparison to those of TANF. It has no meaningful matching requirement – its MOE requirement has been eroded by inflation and the broad flexibility states have in what counts as an allowable expenditure minimizes its usefulness in maintaining a serious state commitment. TANF’s main accountability measures are limited to “assistance” (less than \$8 billion); leaving little accountability for the \$20+ billion in “non-assistance” expenditures. There are hundreds of different state programs funded as “non-assistance,” with little information on what they do, their cost, the number of families served, and their effectiveness. Even for assistance-related

expenditures, work and other requirements intended to ensure accountability are regularly gamed by states. And, there is no requirement for states to evaluate their policy changes, even when they involve changes that terminate assistance altogether (e.g., time limits and full family sanctions).

In fact, the real irony is that TANF replaced an evidence-based welfare reform model, which had strict accountability measures. In 1987, the Reagan Administration began encouraging states to use existing authority to conduct welfare reform experiments – through waivers of AFDC’s rigid rules (and, to a lesser extent, food stamp and Medicaid rules due to more limited waiver authorities for those programs). This approach was continued by President Bush and President Clinton. This process did not provide a fixed level of funding, like block grants. Instead, it relied on an approach that would provide a real counterfactual using the “gold standard” of evaluation – random assignment.<sup>15</sup> It provided rigorous evidence about the impacts of welfare reform, including many examples of state experiments that increased employment and earnings, and also reduced welfare dependency and poverty.<sup>16</sup> The next step would have been to refine this process and expand waiver authorities in other programs. Instead, TANF replaced it with a blank check to states with no accountability. Why? Apparently governors convinced Congress that states knew best how to reform welfare and didn’t need federal approval. As Ron Haskins, an architect of the 1996 law, now concedes, “States did not uphold their end of the bargain. So, why do something like this again?”<sup>17</sup>

**Matt Weidinger:** “Here’s hoping that the New Year and the new Congress will bring less of what Sen. Steve Daines (R-MT) recently called “kicking the can down the road” without meaningful TANF reform. That’s what is really needed to help more low-income parents return to work and start moving up the economic ladder.”

**PC Response:** TANF’s flaws have become too big to ignore – a fact that became evident during the mark-up of a bill in the House Ways and Means Committee, the Jobs and Opportunity with Benefits and Services (JOBS) for Success Act. Rep. Adrian Smith, chairman of the Human Resources subcommittee charged with developing legislation to reauthorize TANF acknowledged that there is “abundant evidence that TANF in its current form is broken.” Similarly, Senator Steve Daines, who considers TANF a success in its early years, called TANF “broken” as well and introduced a modified version of the same legislation.<sup>18</sup> He further noted that Congress has only had one major reauthorization since the law’s inception, with 24 short-term extensions since 2010 alone (25, as of December 7, 2018):

Talk about kicking the can down the road. Efforts to address the persisting concerns about the program have not crossed the finish line. This must change.<sup>19</sup>

An important question about the latest attempt by Congress to reform TANF is, does the legislation “fix the problems” or just “kick the can down the road”? While the JOBS for Success Act would make some modest improvements to TANF, the bill fails to address the root causes of TANF’s problems – the block grant structure, excessive state flexibility (with no meaningful accountability), and poorly designed work requirements. Until Congress confronts these realities, TANF will remain “broken.” See:

“The JOBS for Success Act: A Noble but Futile Attempt to Reform ‘Welfare Reform’,” June 16, 2018, available at: <https://petergermanis.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/The-JOBS-for-Success-Act.pdf>.

“TANF is Broken! Is Congress Fixing the Problems – or Just ‘Kicking the Can Down the Road’? A Response to Senator Steve Daines,” January 1, 2019, available at: <https://petergermanis.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Daines-Response.pdf>.

**Matt Weidinger:** “...taxpayers can at least take some solace that this is the rare federal program that is not getting more expensive.”

**PC Response:** Federal and state spending on TANF represents less than 3 percent of total spending on means-tested welfare programs. The amount spent on cash assistance – the main focus of reform efforts – is less than 1 percent. What taxpayers should be concerned is not so much whether TANF’s block grant is adjusted for inflation, but rather that TANF in its current form is so dysfunctional. Except for giving states maximum flexibility, there is nothing in the law that works as intended. If Weidinger and other conservatives want to be seen as serious anti-poverty thinkers, they should ask themselves the following 10 questions about TANF (and any welfare reform proposal).

1. Does it make sense to have work requirements that don’t work?
2. Does it make sense to have a funding structure for a safety net program that is unresponsive to changes in economic and demographic circumstances?
3. Does it make sense to give states so much flexibility they can count virtually any expenditure as “reasonably calculated” to advance a TANF purpose?
4. Does it make sense to permit states to use TANF funds to supplant existing state expenditures and use it as a giant slush fund?
5. Does it make sense to replace a simple and effective federal-state matching approach with an ineffective, Rube Goldberg-like financing scheme?
6. Does it make sense to give states so much flexibility they can duplicate the benefits and services of dozens of other low-income programs with virtually no accountability?
7. Does it make sense to provide funding for safety net programs that have either no income limit or that permit states to set very high income limits?
8. Does it make sense to impose rules that are ineffective and/or needlessly complicated?
9. Does it make sense to ignore evidence-based research?
10. Does it make sense to use TANF as a model for reforming other welfare programs?

The answer to each question should be “NO,” but TANF has failed with respect to each of the first nine questions and thus should not be a model for reforming other welfare programs. The real irony is that too many conservatives still think it’s a success.

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<sup>1</sup> The views in this document reflect my own as a citizen and do not reflect the views of any organization I am now or have ever been affiliated with. By way of background, I am a conservative and have worked on welfare issues for the Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, and the White House under both President Reagan and President George H.W. Bush. This paper assumes the reader has a basic understanding of the TANF program, but for those readers who want more context and background, see Peter Germanis, *TANF is Broken! It's Time to Reform "Welfare Reform" (And Fix the Problems, Not Treat their Symptoms)*, July 25, 2015 draft, available at: <https://petergermanis.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/TANF-is-Broken.072515.pdf>.

<sup>2</sup> Matt Weidinger, "While Congress differs on border wall, House and Senate bills agree on trimming welfare block grant," American Enterprise Institute, December 21, 2018, available at: <http://www.aei.org/publication/while-congress-differs-on-border-wall-house-and-senate-bills-agree-on-trimming-welfare-block-grant/> and Matt Weidinger, "Latest bipartisan welfare extension clears congress," American Enterprise Institute, January 22, 2019, available at: <http://www.aei.org/publication/latest-bipartisan-welfare-extension-clears-congress/>.

<sup>3</sup> For a detailed analysis, see: *TANF is Broken! It's Time to Reform "Welfare Reform" (And Fix the Problems, Not Treat their Symptoms)*, July 25, 2015 draft, available at: <https://petergermanis.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/TANF-is-Broken.072515.pdf>.

<sup>4</sup> For a detailed analysis of TANF's work requirements, see: "Expanding Work Requirements in Non-Cash Welfare Programs: TANF is NOT a Model, but a Cautionary Tale," October 22, 2018, available at: <https://petergermanis.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/TANF-No-Model.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. General Accounting Office, *Early Fiscal Effects of the TANF Block Grant*, August 1998, pp. 39-40, available at: <https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/226268.pdf>.

<sup>6</sup> Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, *TANF Financial Assistance to Poor Families Is Disappearing in Texas*, November 28, 2018, available at: [https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/tanf\\_trends\\_tx.pdf](https://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/tanf_trends_tx.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Family Assistance, "TANF and MOE Spending and Transfers by Activity, FY 2017 (Contains National & State Pie Charts)," August 23, 2018, available at: [https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ofa/fy2017\\_tanf\\_and\\_moe\\_state\\_piechart.pdf](https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ofa/fy2017_tanf_and_moe_state_piechart.pdf).

<sup>8</sup> The Ways and Means Committee warned states about supplanting state dollars in 2000, but has done nothing to curtail the practice. For an example of the letter sent to each governor, see: <http://fiscalpolicy.org/letter-from-nancy-l-johnson-sent-individually-to-all-50-governors>.

<sup>9</sup> Rep. Lloyd Doggett, "Rep. Doggett: 'It's Time to Fix the Broken Welfare System'," *Talk Poverty*, August 22, 2016, available at: <https://talkpoverty.org/2016/08/22/rep-doggett-time-fix-broken-welfare-system/>.

<sup>10</sup> Rep. Dave Camp, "Camp Releases Report on Obama Administration's History of Undermining Work Requirements," August 21, 2012, available at: <https://votesmart.org/public-statement/735996/camp-releases-report-on-obama-administrations-history-of-undermining-work-requirements#.XEXm1IVKiM8>.

<sup>11</sup> Cited in Rob Bluey, "Paul Ryan: HHS Welfare Work Waiver Will Undermine 1996 Reforms," *The Daily Signal*, September 13, 2012, available at: <http://dailysignal.com/2012/09/13/paul-ryan-hhs-welfare-work-waiver-willundermine-1996-reforms/>.

<sup>12</sup> Rep. Kevin Brady, "Twenty years after welfare reform, the path ahead," August 22, 2016, available at: <http://waysandmeans.house.gov/icymi-chairman-brady-op-ed-hill-20th-anniversary-welfare-reform/>.

<sup>13</sup> Council of Economic Advisers, *Expanding Work Requirements in Non-Cash Welfare Programs*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, July 2018), p. 47, available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Expanding-Work-Requirements-in-Non-Cash-Welfare-Programs.pdf>.

<sup>14</sup> U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Budget, *Concurrent Resolution on the Budget – Fiscal Year 2017*, March 2016, p. 67, available at: [http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/fy2017\\_budget\\_resolution.pdf](http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/fy2017_budget_resolution.pdf).

<sup>15</sup> For an excellent summary of the issues and deliberations during this period, see Judith M. Gueron and Howard Rolston, *Fighting for Reliable Evidence* (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, June 2013).

<sup>16</sup> Jeffrey Grogger, Lynn A. Karoly, and Jacob Alex Klerman, *Consequences of Welfare Reform: A Research Synthesis* (Santa Monica, CA: July 2002), [http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/welfare\\_employ/res\\_synthesis/reports/consequences\\_of\\_wr/rand\\_report.pdf](http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/opre/welfare_employ/res_synthesis/reports/consequences_of_wr/rand_report.pdf).

<sup>17</sup> Eduardo Porter, "The Republican Party's Strategy to Ignore Poverty," *The New York Times*, October 27, 2015, available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/28/business/economy/a-strategy-to-ignore-poverty.html>.

<sup>18</sup> The House version of the bill, H.R. 5861, can be found at: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/5861/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22jobs+for+success%22%5D%7D&r=1&s=1>; the Senate version, S. 3692, can be found at: <https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3692/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22jobs+for+success%22%5D%7D&r=2&s=1>.

<sup>19</sup> Senator Steve Daines, "TANF," *Congressional Record*, December 6, 2018, p. S7339, available at: <https://www.congress.gov/115/crec/2018/12/06/CREC-2018-12-06-senate.pdf>.